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Introduction
Demographic change can have profound effects 
on a country’s economy and public finances. 
These effects generally manifest themselves over 
multi-decade periods, but the deterioration in 
many countries’ public finances and concerns 
about their underlying growth potential have 
recently brought demographic issues to the fore. 
Against this background, this article reviews the 
medium-term demographic changes projected 
to occur in a range of economies – the United 
States, Japan, Germany and Italy, along with China, 
India, Mexico, Korea, Indonesia and ‘east Asia   
(excluding China and Japan)’.1 These countries are 
either important to Australia as trading partners or 
illustrate the various demographic challenges now 
facing different economies. The article then sets 
out the key channels through which demography 
influences countries’ trend growth rates, and 
quantifies in broad terms the scale of the likely direct 
impact of demographic developments over the 
next decade.2
*  The authors are from Economic Analysis Department.
1 In addition to Korea and Indonesia, this latter bloc includes   
Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.
2  While the graphs in this article generally extend to 2050, the focus in 
the analysis is on the next decade. This reflects that, absent significant 
changes in net migration patterns, considerable reliance can be 
placed on demographic projections of working-age population 
growth over a 10-year horizon, since all those who will enter the 
working-age cohort by 2020 have already been born.
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Projected Demographic 
Developments
The demographic data used in this article are taken 
from the 2008 Revision of the UN’s World Population 
Prospects,  adopting the central scenarios for the 
population projections for each country (as opposed 
to the high- and low-fertility variants).3 These central 
scenarios assume a continuation of recent patterns 
and policies on migration in each nation – so that 
the possibility of substantial shifts in migration 
trends should be thought of as a key caveat to the 
analysis presented here.4
At a global level, steep declines in fertility rates 
have seen world population growth fall from an 
annual rate of 2 per cent in the 1970s to around 
1.2 per cent today, largely reflecting the tendency 
for family size to decline with improvements in 
living standards (Graph  1). Although long-term 
projections are subject to considerable uncertainty, 
world population is now forecast to peak in the 
second half of this century, at somewhat over 
9 billion, before starting to decline. 
3  See <http://esa.un.org/unpp/> and UN (2009). Data for Taiwan are 
sourced from the US Census Bureau’s International Data Base.
4  Recent developments in Australia illustrate how large an impact shifts 
in migration numbers can have on projections of labour force and 
output growth, as discussed in RBA (2009).
Substantial demographic shifts are under way in many countries which could have a sizeable 
impact on trend growth rates over coming decades. this article explores some of these 
demographic developments, particularly in relation to population growth and age structure, for 
a range of economies. it also examines some of the direct effects that these changes could have 
on average growth over the next 10 years.16 ReSeRve Bank of auStRalia
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to fall more noticeably; and in Japan the population 
has already started to turn down and, absent a 
major change in birth rates or immigration, appears 
poised to experience an almost unprecedented 
peace-time decline of around 20 per cent over the 
next four decades. In contrast, population continues 
to rise rapidly in Indonesia and India, with the latter 
expected to overtake China as the world’s most 
populous nation in around 2030.
Besides population, another summary indicator 
of demographic trends, capturing changes in a 
country’s age structure, is the dependency ratio – 
the non-working-age population expressed as a 
percentage of the working-age population (defined 
here as those aged 15 to 64). In many countries the 
dependency ratio rose through the 1950s and then 
fell steeply through the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, 
with the exact timing varying by country (Graph 3). 
While these declines were sizeable in the United 
States, Germany and Italy, they were much larger 
again in China, Indonesia, Korea and Mexico – with 
China also experiencing a further marked step-down 
in its dependency ratio over the past 15 years. In all 
countries except India, however, this situation is 
expected to reverse over the next four decades – 
in some cases very sharply (Japan, Korea, Germany, 
Italy) – with dependency ratios projected to rise to 
form the second half of the rough ‘U’-shape evident 
for most countries.
These ‘U’-shapes generally reflect the gradual ageing 
of the population following the post-War baby boom. 
This boom resulted in high youth dependency in 
most countries through the 1950s and 1960s, but 
falling birth rates then saw plummeting youth 
dependency, which in turn drove down overall 
dependency ratios (Graph  4). This situation is 
now reversing, as the post-War generation enters 
retirement, rapidly lifting aged dependency ratios in 
most economies.
These global data, however, mask notable 
differences in demographic developments at a 
national level (Graph  2).  In Europe, fertility rates 
in many countries have, for some time, been far   
below the level consistent with a stable population 
in the long run (absent net immigration), and 
population has already started to decline in Germany. 
A range of countries in Asia are also expected to 
see population declines and significant population 
ageing in the foreseeable future. For example, 
China’s population is projected to peak in around 
20 years’ time at just under 1½ billion, before slowly 
contracting. In Korea, the population is expected 
both to peak earlier (around 2020) and thereafter 
ReSeRve Bank of auStRalia
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Of course, implicit in the terminology ‘dependency 
ratio’ is that age 65 represents a suitable threshold   
for judging when individuals should cease to 
be viewed as ‘working age’, and instead become 
‘dependants’. Whether this will continue to be so is 
an important issue. In this context, it is notable that 
various countries have already taken steps to mitigate 
some of the impact of rising aged dependency, 
through gradual increases in the pension age.
A further aspect of rising dependency ratios is the 
extent to which these reflect projected increases 
in the proportion of very elderly people in the 
population. In many European nations, with life 
expectancy continuing to rise and low birth rates 
for the past several decades, the ‘very old age 
dependency ratio’ – those aged 80 and over as a 
percentage of the working-age population – is 
anticipated to pick up sharply (Graph 5). The same 
is true for Japan and Korea, with the rapid increase 
phase for this ratio already well under way in Japan. 
By contrast, in the United States the rise in the very 
old age dependency ratio is projected to be more 
gradual (albeit still substantial), while in India and 
Indonesia little increase in this ratio is expected for 
the foreseeable future.
Quantifying the Impact of 
Demography on Growth
Demography has both direct and indirect effects 
on a country’s GDP growth. The main focus in the 
following is on the direct impacts, although there 
is also a brief discussion of some of the potential 
indirect effects.
Principal direct effects of demography 
on growth
Annual output growth can be decomposed into 
the sum of growth in total labour input and labour 
productivity growth. Demographic change directly 
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these factors, which can itself be broken down into 
three components:5
  • population growth;
  • growth in the working-age share of the 
population; and
  • changes in the participation rate of those of 
working age.
Graph  6 illustrates that population growth is 
already detracting from GDP growth in Japan and 
Germany. In both China and Korea it is expected 
to begin doing so in the foreseeable future, after 
contributing strongly to growth in both cases for 
much of the latter part of the last century. For the 
United States, by contrast, population growth is 
5  This decomposition ignores cyclical influences such as fluctuations 
in the unemployment rate (consistent with a focus on assessing 
long-run average growth). It also abstracts from trend changes in 
average hours worked (where the influence of demography, if any, is 
unclear), and from changes in the labour input of those aged under 
15 or over 64 (non-working age).
Graph 6
*H ong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan and Thailand














































*H ong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan and Thailand




Working Age Share Growth

















































projected to continue to contribute solidly to GDP 
growth, reflecting ongoing high net immigration 
(in part from Mexico, where net migration is 
correspondingly negative). In India, population 
growth – although gradually slowing – is forecast to 
exceed 0.7 per cent per annum on average over the 
next four decades, despite negligible net migration.
Turning to the impact on trend growth from shifts 
in the working-age share of the population – that is, 
from compositional change in population structure 
– Graph 7 illustrates that within 10 years this impact   
is projected to turn  negative in most of the 
economies considered, if it has not already 
done so. For Korea,  the change over time in this 
compositional effect on growth is especially striking; 
in the 1970s and 1980s this factor was contributing 
1–1½  percentage points to annual GDP growth, 
whereas by the mid 2020s it is projected to be 
subtracting a full percentage point.19 Bulletin | june Quarter 2010
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Finally, these reductions in trend growth rates 
could be mitigated to some degree by increases 
in labour force participation (the third factor 
listed above). Comparing male and female 
participation rates, for most of the economies 
considered there may be scope for GDP to be raised 
by increasing female participation.6 For example, 
while the female participation rate in the 
United States is around 60  per cent – not 
substantially different from the rate for 
males of just over 70  per cent – it is around 
50  per cent in Germany, Korea and Japan,   
and just 40  per cent in Italy. However, since it is 
unclear how demographic developments might 
influence aggregate participation rates in different 
countries over coming decades, no attempt is 
made here to quantify the impact of this third   
factor on either historical or prospective annual 
output growth.
6  This observation abstracts from the accounting issue of unpaid work 
in the home not being counted as part of GDP. National statisticians 
adopt this approach because of the difficulty of accurately measuring 
such output, and the need to set a ‘production boundary’ for what 
is and is not included in GDP. However, it almost certainly results in 
the impact on measured GDP from stay-at-home parents entering the 
workforce being greater than the true impact on output.
Quantifying the direct impact of changes in 
population growth and structure
It is possible to combine the impact of the first two 
direct effects of demographic change, population 
growth and growth in the working-age population 
share, to obtain estimates for the potential direct 
impact of demography on trend growth over 
the coming decade, relative to the recent past   
(Tables 1 and 2). The comparison period 1996–2005 
is used because it precedes the recent major global 
downturn, the impact of which is still playing out, 
while representing a reasonable baseline period for 
assessing trend growth.
As Table  1 shows, demographic factors were 
already subtracting from growth in Japan and 
Germany in the decade 1996–2005, compared 
with a large positive annual contribution of around 
1¼ percentage points in the United States. Indeed, 
Table 1: Demography and Growth – Advanced Economies
  uS japan Germany Italy
Baseline period 1996–2005        
Average annual real GDP growth 3.3 1.1 1.3 1.4
  total direct contribution from demography 1.3 –0.3 –0.1 0.0
   Contribution from population growth 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
   Contribution from growth in the working-age share 0.2 –0.5 –0.2 –0.3
  Memo item: average growth adjusted for demographic change 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.4
         
Impact of demographic change 2011–2020        
  expected contribution to annual growth from demography 0.5 –1.0 –0.4 –0.2
   Contribution from population growth 0.9 –0.3 –0.2 0.1
   Contribution from growth in the working-age share –0.3 –0.7 –0.2 –0.3
  Change in direct demographic contribution to growth –0.8 –0.6 –0.3 –0.2
Sources: RBA; Thomson Reuters; United Nations20 ReSeRve Bank of auStRalia
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once this direct demographic effect is stripped 
out, the adjusted average annual growth rates of 
all four advanced economies, over these 10 years, 
were within 0.6 percentage points of each other. 
Excluding the United States they were even closer 
– within 0.1 percentage points of each other – with 
average growth in Japan fractionally higher than 
in Germany and Italy. This provides an interesting 
perspective on the ongoing debate about the ‘lost 
decade’ for the Japanese economy.
It is also notable that correcting for shifts in the 
working-age share of the population makes these 
adjusted growth rates much closer than simply 
correcting for population growth. For example, 
average annual growth rates for the United States 
and Japan over the decade 1996–2005 were   
closer in per capita  terms (2.2  per cent versus   
1.0 per cent) than in headline terms (3.3 per cent   
versus 1.1  per cent). However, they were much   
closer again (2.0 per cent versus 1.5 per cent) after 
also adjusting for changes in population structure 
over this period, through a working-age share 
correction.
For the decade ahead, changes in demography 
are expected to directly lower growth by the 
largest amount, relative to the 1996–2005 period, 
in the United States, where they may shave 
0.8  percentage points off average annual GDP 
growth. In Japan, the negative impact is anticipated 
to be almost as large (0.6  percentage points),   
while in Germany and Italy it is likely to be   
somewhat smaller.7
Turning to Table  2, demographic change is 
projected to directly lower underlying GDP growth 
in China over the next decade by more than in any 
of the other economies considered – subtracting 
around 1¼  percentage points from average 
annual growth relative to the period 1996–2005 
7  As a result, if average growth in the GDP deflator and in labour 
productivity were to be the same in each country over the coming 
decade as over the period 1996–2005, even nominal GDP might be 
expected to decline over the next 10 years in Japan, which would 
complicate the task of repairing that nation’s public finances.
(with ¼  percentage points of this due to slower 
population growth, and  1  percentage point due 
to a decline in growth of the working-age share of 
the population). In India and Mexico the downward 
impact on annual trend growth from demographic 
change is expected to be smaller but still significant. 
Nevertheless, in both cases the direct contribution 
to growth from demography is projected to remain 
solidly positive over the coming decade (exceeding 
1½ percentage points per annum in India).
As for the other east Asian economies, at an 
aggregate  level demographic factors directly 
accounted for a sizeable fraction of average growth 
in the region over the baseline period 1996–2005, 
contributing almost half of the annual growth 
recorded over this decade. Indeed, population 
growth was nearly 1½  per cent for the region as 
a whole and exceeded 2  per cent per annum in 
Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines; while 
changes in the working-age share of the population 
separately added around ½  percentage points to 
annual growth in each of the ASEAN-4 countries 
(and a smaller amount in the higher-income 
Asian economies).
Looking ahead, Table  2 shows that in Korea the 
ageing of the population is projected to directly 
reduce trend growth between 1996–2005 and 
2011–2020 by around ¾  percentage points (after 
already subtracting a full 2  percentage points 
between 1976 –1985 and 1996–2005). Demographic 
change is also expected to have a broadly similar 
negative impact on trend growth in the east Asia 
bloc as a whole.
Finally, it is notable that the slowing in trend growth 
due to demographic factors is expected to be 
greater over the next decade in all of the economies 
considered in Table 2 than in either of the European 
countries in Table  1. This chiefly reflects that the 
direct contribution from demography to growth 
was already much lower in Germany and Italy, in the 
baseline period, than in these other economies.21 Bulletin | june Quarter 2010
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Table 2: Demography and Growth – Other Economies
  China India Mexico
Baseline period 1996–2005
Average annual real GDP growth 8.8 6.5 3.7
  total direct contribution from demography 1.4 2.2 2.1
   Contribution from population growth 0.8 1.7 1.4
   Contribution from growth in the working-age share 0.6 0.5 0.6
  Memo item: average growth adjusted for demographic change 7.3 4.2 1.6
Impact of demographic change 2011–2020
  expected contribution to annual growth from demography 0.2 1.6 1.1
   Contribution from population growth 0.6 1.2 0.7
   Contribution from growth in the working-age share –0.3 0.4 0.4
  Change in direct demographic contribution to growth –1.2 –0.6 –1.0
South Korea Indonesia east asia(a)
Baseline period 1996–2005
Average annual real GDP growth 4.4 2.7 4.0
    total direct contribution from demography 0.7 1.9 1.8
  Contribution from population growth 0.6 1.4 1.4
  Contribution from growth in the working-age share 0.1 0.5 0.4
    Memo item: average growth adjusted for demographic change 3.6 0.8 2.2
 
Impact of demographic change 2011–2020
    expected contribution to annual growth from demography 0.0 1.2 1.0
  Contribution from population growth 0.2 0.9 0.9
  Contribution from growth in the working-age share –0.2 0.3 0.1
    Change in direct demographic contribution to growth –0.7 –0.6 –0.7
(a) Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand
Sources: CEIC; RBA; Thomson Reuters; United Nations; US Census Bureau
Potential indirect effects of demography 
on growth
There are a number of other ways in which shifts 
in demography or labour force participation might 
alter countries’ trend GDP growth rates. As noted 
earlier, one which would boost average growth at 
the margin would be an increasing propensity to 
remain in work among those aged 65 and over. In 
2005, the participation rate among this age group 
was only 3 per cent in Italy, compared with over   
15  per  cent in the United States, 20  per cent in   
Japan and around 30 per cent in Korea.
It is also possible that demographic change could 
influence growth through altering the propensity 
for societies to innovate and take risks. On the one 
hand, younger societies could be more dynamic 
and entrepreneurial than older ones. On average, 
people in their twenties or thirties may feel more 22 ReSeRve Bank of auStRalia
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inclined than older people to start a new business 
or stake their savings on developing an innovative 
new product, given their greater time until planned 
retirement and lesser exposure to the challenges 
involved in establishing a successful business. 
Hence, the ongoing rise in the median age of the 
population in most countries could result in slower 
average productivity growth (Graph  8). On the 
other hand, by generating upward pressure on the 
cost of labour relative to capital due to growing 
scarcity of available workers, population ageing 
could increase the pressure for firms to innovate, as   
a way of controlling costs.8
Finally, some aspects of the interaction between 
demography and financial markets could also act to 
dampen average growth in countries with ageing 
populations. For example, if a country’s population 
were projected to decline, with the share of adults 
of typical household-forming age also projected to 
fall, this might be expected over time to weigh on 
demand both for housing and for riskier financial 
products such as equities or corporate bonds 
relative to government bonds. If so, then to differing 
degrees across different asset markets, these 
expectations could become incorporated into both 
8   See Kent, Kulish and Smith (2006).
current asset prices and anticipated asset price 
growth, potentially depressing near-term aggregate 
demand and output growth through wealth effects 
and disincentives to invest.9
Conclusion
Substantial demographic shifts are under way 
in many countries which could have a sizeable 
influence on trend growth rates over coming 
decades. In particular:
  • Many countries can expect to see a noticeable 
step-down in trend GDP growth in the 
decade 2011–2020 (measured relative to the 
decade 1996–2005) due to the direct impact 
of demographic change. This reduction in 
annual trend growth is projected to exceed 
½  percentage points in many countries, with 
China expected to experience a particularly 
pronounced reduction of around 1¼ percentage 
points.
  • While population ageing is most commonly 
associated with various European nations and 
Japan, a number of other east Asian economies 
are following similar demographic trajectories, 
just a decade or two later. All other things equal, 
the impact of slowing population growth and 
diminishing expansion in the working-age 
population share could lower trend growth in 
east Asia (excluding China and Japan) by almost 
1 percentage point over the decade 2011–2020, 
relative to the period 1996–2005.10
  • In contrast to the situation in many east Asian 
economies, population continues to rise rapidly 
in Indonesia and India, with India expected to 
overtake China as the world’s most populous 
nation in around 20 years’ time.  
9  See RBA (2006).
10 This calculation makes allowance for the fact that the projected 
decline in growth in the working-age population in east Asia over the 
coming decade is generally more pronounced in those economies 
with high labour productivity than in those economies where the 
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